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INTRODUCTION 
In Grayson v. AT&T Corp. (Grayson II),1 the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals sitting en banc held that a D.C. statute that 
purportedly granted individuals standing without suffering an injury-
in-fact did not actually do so.2  The court rested on tenuous grounds 
and held as a matter of statutory interpretation and legislative history 
that the D.C. Council did not make explicit its intent to overrule 
years of the court’s standing requirements.3  In doing so, the court 
avoided a clear opportunity to answer the question of whether the 
Article III case-or-controversy requirement applies in D.C. courts. 
Long-established precedent holds that Article III standing 
requirements do not apply in state courts and courts of the 
territories.4  The local D.C. court system is an anomaly in the United 
States because it is intended to function as a state court system, but 
D.C.’s unique nature as a federal enclave implicates constitutional 
issues that do not encumber state courts.5  Section 11-705(b) of the 
D.C. Code appears to be an inconspicuous section governing the 
logistical administration of the D.C. Court of Appeals, but courts have 
interpreted its language that “[c]ases and controversies shall be heard 
and determined by divisions of the court”6 to statutorily incorporate 
Article III standing requirements into the D.C. courts.  This Note 
addresses the question that the D.C. Court of Appeals avoided7:  Does 
                                                          
 1. 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011) (en banc). 
 2. Id. at 224; see D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001). 
 3. Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 238. 
 4. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) (“[T]he 
special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts are not binding on the state courts.”); Life of the Land v. Land Use 
Comm’n, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (Haw. 1981) (“[T]he courts of Hawaii are not subject to 
a ‘cases or controversies’ limitation like that imposed upon the federal judiciary by 
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution . . . .”). 
 5. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (discussing Congress’s 
plenary power over D.C. provided by Article I’s proscription that Congress may 
“exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” D.C. (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17)). 
 6. D.C. CODE § 11-705(b) (2001) (emphasis added). 
 7. See Bruce Comly French, Broadened Concepts of Standing in the Local District of 
Columbia Courts, 23 HOW. L.J. 255, 263 (1980) (“[T]he question of a full-blown 
analysis of the standing doctrine in the District of Columbia local courts has not been 
undertaken . . . .”). 
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the D.C. Code statutorily incorporate Article III standing 
requirements? 
Part I of this Note examines Congress’s plenary power over D.C. 
and traces the creation of the modern-day D.C. court system as 
Article I courts.  It then examines Congress’s analogous power over 
the territories pursuant to Article IV, focusing on the power’s plenary 
nature and Congress’s extraordinary ability to legislate free from 
other constitutional restraints.  Finally, Part I discusses Article III 
standing rules, which create federal courts of limited jurisdiction, and 
inconsistent jurisprudence regarding the applicability of standing 
requirements in D.C. courts.  Part II examines the history of the 
Grayson cases and the D.C. Council’s attempt to convey standing 
without injury-in-fact.  After analyzing the legislative history of section 
11-705(b), implications of the courts’ nature as courts of general 
jurisdiction, and the policies behind Article III standing, this Note 
concludes that Congress did not statutorily incorporate the case-or-
controversy requirement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Congressional Power over D.C. 
Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution grants 
Congress plenary power over the District of Columbia.8  This broad 
grant of power means that Congress serves the role of both state and 
federal government in D.C.9  This permits Congress to regulate 
conduct in D.C. that it could not regulate in the national arena and 
allows Congress to exercise police powers and act as a state legislature 
might.10  This includes the ability to establish a judicial system, 
provided that Congress does not violate any other constitutional 
                                                          
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (providing that Congress shall have power “[t]o 
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not 
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the 
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States”); 
Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397 (stating that Congress’s plenary authority in the District 
includes police and regulatory powers normally exercised by state governments). 
 9. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838) 
(holding that in D.C. “[t]here is . . . no division of powers between the general and 
state governments”). 
 10. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397–98 (distinguishing Congress’s power to legislate 
pursuant to clause 17 from its powers to legislate pursuant to its other section 8 
powers); Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional Representation for 
the District of Columbia:  Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of 
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the District, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 783, 806–07 (2009) (observing that Congress has “the same kind of 
plenary power that a state legislature possesses” when legislating for D.C.). 
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limitation on its authority.11  Although Congress may act similarly to a 
state legislature, the Court has long held that D.C. is distinct from the 
states.12 
Congress’s power over D.C. is in many ways analogous to its power 
over the territories pursuant to Article IV.13  In American Insurance Co. 
v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter),14 Chief Justice Marshall held that 
territorial courts created pursuant to Congress’s plenary power under 
Article IV were “legislative Courts” rather than “constitutional Courts” 
and thus did not exercise the judicial power of the United States, but 
could nonetheless exercise jurisdiction over matters enumerated in 
Article III.15  Because Congress acted pursuant to its Article IV powers 
to regulate the territories, these courts were not constrained by 
Article III and therefore could consist of judges lacking life tenure.16  
In so ruling, Chief Justice Marshall focused on the unique nature of 
Congress’s authority over the territories as the “combined powers of 
the general, and of a state government.”17  This ruling applied only to 
the territories and left unanswered the question of whether other 
non-Article III federal courts also faced a similar lack of 
constriction.18 
Subsequent courts have clarified and elaborated on the meaning of 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Canter.  Justice Harlan, speaking 
for a plurality of the Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,19 explained that 
the practical realities of governing the territories coupled with weak 
territorial governments meant that judges appointed by Congress of 
                                                          
 11. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899) (establishing that Congress 
“may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts . . . as it may 
think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the constitution”). 
 12. See Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452–53 (1805) (holding that 
D.C. residents could not bring a diversity suit in federal court because they are not 
citizens of a state as the Constitution uses the term).  The Court in National Mutual 
Insurance Co. of District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), 
upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s expansion of diversity jurisdiction to 
permit suit by D.C. residents.  The Court fractured in its reasoning, with Justice 
Jackson joined by Justices Black and Burton arguing that the District Clause enabled 
Congress to legislate beyond the nine heads of judicial power expressed in Article III.  
Id. at 600 (plurality opinion).  Justices Rutledge and Murphy argued that D.C. was 
encompassed within Article III.  Id. at 625–26 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose 
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States . . . .”). 
 14. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
 15. Id. at 546. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Kenneth G. Coffin, Limiting Legislative Courts:  Protecting Article III from 
Article I Evisceration, 16 BARRY L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (posing questions left unanswered by 
Canter). 
 19. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
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necessity heard many cases that otherwise would have been heard by 
state courts.20  Justice Harlan’s language that “[w]hen the peculiar 
reasons justifying investiture of judges with limited tenure have not 
been present, the Canter holding has not been deemed controlling” 
indicates that Article III’s requirements do not categorically apply in 
non-Article III courts.21  The Court has subsequently held that D.C. is 
another such area where these “peculiar reasons” are present.22 
B. Modern-Day D.C. Courts 
1. Congressional creation of Article I courts in the District 
The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure 
Act of 197023 created the Article I D.C. Superior Court and the D.C. 
Court of Appeals.24  The Act bifurcated the previously unified court 
system in D.C. into separate court systems, modeled after the federal-
state court system.25  Congress created the Article III Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit and the federal district court with jurisdiction 
over matters of national concern, while the Article I D.C. Superior 
Court and D.C. Court of Appeals were limited to cases of local 
concern.26  Congress intended for the local D.C. courts to function 
similarly to state courts, that is, outside the purview of Article III.27  As 
                                                          
 20. Id. at 545 (plurality opinion). 
 21. Id. at 548 (citing O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933)). 
 22. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 409–10 (1973) (holding that life 
tenure and salary protections do not apply in the local D.C. courts established 
pursuant to Article I). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the D.C. CODE). 
 24. D.C. CODE § 11-101(2) (2001) (stating that the courts were “established 
pursuant to [A]rticle I of the Constitution”); H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 44 (1970) 
(“This title makes clear (section 11-101) that the District of Columbia Courts . . . are 
Article I courts, created pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States 
Constitution, and not Article III courts.”); S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969) (“The 
specific reference to the constitutional authority for the creation of the respective 
court systems makes clear that [A]rticle I, section 8, clause 16 [sic], is relied upon for 
the creation of [the local D.C. Courts].”). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 35 (providing that there will be a “Federal-State court 
system in the District of Columbia analogous to court systems in the several States”). 
 26. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408 (discussing Congress’s intent to remedy the 
problem of a unified court system unable to effectively service local and national 
concerns by creating two court systems with separate jurisdictions). 
 27. See Hickey v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 457 F. Supp. 584, 586 (D.D.C. 1978) 
(“The D.C. Court of Appeals is the highest court of the District of Columbia, and its 
status is that of a state supreme court.”); see also S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (“By creating 
the local courts under authority granted by [A]rticle I of the Constitution, the local 
District of Columbia court structure is not bound by the provisions found in [A]rticle 
III of the Constitution.”); Wesley S. Williams, Jr., District of Columbia Court 
Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEO L.J. 477, 490 (1971) (discussing how Congress intended 
to “free the [A]rticle I local court system from the judicial tenure constraint in 
[A]rticle III”).  The driving intent of the D.C. court system was to reduce the extreme 
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part of the bifurcation, the local court judges were explicitly not 
afforded life tenure, an inescapable aspect of Article III courts.28  
Congress’s distinction between the Article I and Article III courts 
operating in D.C. was intentional.29 
To enable the local D.C. courts to function as courts of general 
jurisdiction similar to state courts, Congress granted the D.C. 
Superior Court the power to hear “any civil action or other matter (at 
law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia”30 and invested 
the D.C. Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction.31  The Supreme 
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the D.C. Court of Appeals 
in the same manner as state supreme courts, further evincing 
Congress’s intent to treat the D.C. courts analogously to state courts.32 
Within the subchapter labeled “Continuation and Organization” of 
the D.C. Court of Appeals is a curious section labeled “Assignment of 
judges; divisions; hearings.”33  Section 11-705(b) states:  “Cases and 
controversies shall be heard and determined by divisions of the court 
unless a hearing or a rehearing before the court in banc is 
ordered.”34  The legislative history of section 11-705(b) in the Court 
Reform Act is not illuminative on its face, with both the House and 
Senate Reports stating that it was a “recodification” of prior law 
providing for the assignment of judges, divisions, and hearings.35 
The section was originally enacted in 1967 when the number of 
judges on the then Article III D.C. Court of Appeals was increased 
from two to five.36  The legislative history of the original enactment 
indicates that Congress intended to provide some measure of relief to 
the beleaguered and backlogged court system by increasing the 
number of judges on the court.37  In an effort to increase the court’s 
                                                          
backlog of criminal cases that had developed under the previous unified system.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 3 (describing Congress’s motivation to reduce the high rate 
of crime that resulted from a court system unable to handle its caseload). 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 38; S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 8; see also Palmore, 411 U.S. 
at 409–10 (confirming Congress’s power to enact such a provision). 
 29. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408 (describing these as “a wholly separate court system”). 
 30. D.C. CODE § 1-204.31(a) (2001); D.C. CODE § 11-921 (2001); see also Note, 
Federal and Local Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, 92 YALE L.J. 292, 299 n.27 (1982) 
(describing D.C. courts as “quasi-state courts of general jurisdiction, without any 
attributes of Article III courts”). 
 31. D.C. CODE § 11-721 (granting the court jurisdiction over appeals from “all 
final orders and judgments of the Superior Court”). 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (providing that the D.C. Court of Appeals is 
treated as a “highest court of a State” for purposes of Supreme Court certiorari). 
 33. D.C. CODE § 11-705. 
 34. Id. § 11-705(b) (emphasis added). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 134 (1970); S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 20 (1969). 
 36. Act of Dec. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-178, § 1(3)(A), 81 Stat. 544, 545. 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 90-378, at 3–4 (1967) (describing the additional judges as 
“imperative” to a smooth court system); S. REP. NO. 90-802, at 3 (1967) (focusing on 
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efficiency even further, Congress permitted the court to sit as a panel 
of three judges instead of requiring all five.38  In passing this section, 
Congress’s focus appeared to be on the latter half of the sentence—
permitting panels of three judges.39  The two congressional reports 
accompanying the bill used the phrase “cases and controversies” one 
time each and provided no further explanation or analysis of the 
words.  Instead, the reports devote their discussion to the newly 
created panel system.40 
In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government 
and Governmental Reorganization Act,41 delegating some of 
Congress’s plenary power to a newly created D.C. Council and 
Mayor.42  Although Congress delegated many powers to the D.C. 
Council, it explicitly prohibited the D.C. Council from legislating in 
several areas, including over the organization and jurisdiction of the 
judiciary.43  Congress also retained an ultimate veto over most laws 
passed by the D.C. Council, with laws only taking effect after 
presentment to both Houses and the passage of thirty days during 
which Congress is in session without passing a joint resolution 
disproving of the act.44 
                                                          
the increased number of judges as a response to the court’s consistently 
overburdened caseload). 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 90-378, at 3–4 (reporting that other courts utilize the division 
system “to keep up with their work”); S. REP. NO. 90-802, at 3 (expressing the intent 
to allow the court to “eliminate its present backlog and to keep its docket current”). 
 39. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-378, at 1  (“This expanded court is to be separated into 
divisions consisting of three judges each, for hearing and determining cases and 
controversies, except when a hearing or a rehearing is ordered before the court in 
banc.”); S. REP. NO. 90-802, at 1 (same). 
 40. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-378; S. REP. NO. 90-802; see also Williams, supra note 27, at 
490 (indicating that Congress may have “intended to avoid the case or controversy 
constraint” in enacting the courts). 
 41. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the D.C. CODE). 
 42. See D.C. CODE §§ 1-201.01 to -207.71 (2001). 
 43. Id. § 1-206.02(a)(4) (“The Council shall have no authority to . . . [e]nact any 
act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 11 (relating to 
organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts) . . . .”); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 93-482, at 1008 (1973) (stating the Congress intended to prohibit the D.C. 
Council from “changing Title 11 of the D.C. Code providing for the organization, 
administration and jurisdiction of the District Courts”). 
 44. D.C. CODE § 1-206.02(c)(1).  The D.C. Code is considered a law of the United 
States because it is passed by Congress, regardless of its limited geographical 
application.  See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400 (1973) (making no 
distinction between acts passed by Congress that are codified in the U.S. Code and 
those codified in the D.C. Code).  But see Note, supra note 30, at 294 (arguing that 
the D.C. Code should not be considered federal law because Congress is not acting 
in its national legislative capacity). 
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2. Palmore and the constitutionality of Article I D.C. courts 
In Palmore v. United States,45 the Court addressed a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the newly created D.C. court system.46  The Court 
rejected a criminal defendant’s claim that his trial before judges 
lacking Article III tenure and salary protections violated his due 
process rights and upheld the constitutionality of judges of the D.C. 
courts to hear criminal cases arising under the D.C. Code.47  The 
Court built upon the decision in Canter that allowed territorial courts 
created pursuant to Article IV and courts-martial to operate outside 
the strictures of Article III.48 
Justice White drew a distinction between laws of national 
applicability, which require Article III protections, and laws passed 
pursuant to Congress’s power to legislate for “specialized areas having 
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.”49  Keying 
on Congress’s concerted intent to create a local court system that 
functioned like state courts—including judges without life tenure—
and the historical ability of state courts to hear federal criminal cases, 
the Court held that Congress acted constitutionally when it created 
Article I D.C. courts staffed by judges lacking Article III tenure and 
salary protections.50  Although Palmore establishes that Article III, 
section 1 does not apply to D.C. courts, it did not explicitly address 
the applicability of Article III, section II, including the case-or-
controversy requirement. 
3. Congress can legislate over D.C. free from Article III constraints 
The Court has examined the reach of Palmore’s holding in 
subsequent cases involving the constitutionality of other legislative 
courts.  Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.51 discussed Congress’s power 
to create bankruptcy courts staffed by judges lacking life tenure 
empowered to hear matters “arising in or related to” the underlying 
bankruptcy case.52  The Court fractured in its reasoning, but held that 
                                                          
 45. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). 
 46. Id. at 390. 
 47. Id. at 410. 
 48. Id. at 402–04 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); 
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)); see also Coffin, supra note 18, at 7–8 (analyzing 
Justice White’s opinion in Palmore as depending upon Chief Justice Marshall’s theory 
in Canter that Congress can exercise police power over the territories and D.C.). 
 49. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408. 
 50. See id. at 401–02, 408–10 (implying that the historical fact of federal 
prosecution in state court is dispositive as to its constitutionality). 
 51. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 52. Id. at 53–54 (plurality opinion). 
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the bankruptcy courts were unconstitutional because they were 
composed of non-Article III judges who exercised Article III judicial 
power.53  Noting that the Court in Canter and Palmore established that 
Congress can create legislative courts that are an “exception from the 
general prescription of Art[icle] III,”54  Justice Brennan limited those 
holdings based on the courts’ geographic location “outside the States 
of the Federal Union” and Congress’s “exceptional constitutional 
grants of power” in those areas.55 
Justice Brennan focused his analysis on the extraordinary powers 
granted to Congress in the District Clause, the clause granting 
Congress power over the Armed Forces, and Article IV, as compared 
to the limited nature of Congress’s other grants of authority in Article 
I, section 8.56  The Court ultimately held that Congress acted 
unconstitutionally when it created the bankruptcy court system 
because these historical exceptions were not present.57  This analysis 
clarified that when legislating for D.C., Congress utilizes a power 
“different in kind from the other broad powers conferred on 
Congress.”58 
Justice Brennan further limited the language in Canter and Palmore 
granting Congress plenary power over “specialized areas having 
particularized needs”59 as applying only to “geographic areas, such as 
the District of Columbia.”60  The limited geographic applicability of 
the D.C. Code and laws governing the territories, as opposed to the 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 76. 
 54. Id. at 64–65 & n.16 (explaining that Congress was empowered to create 
courts “not in conformity with Art[icle] III”). 
 55. Id. at 70–71 & n.25. 
 56. Id. at 73–74 & n.27; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 n.3 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (contrasting Congress’s plenary power under 
Article I, section 8, clause 17 with its limited power under the Commerce Clause); 
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[U]nlike the District Clause, 
which empowers Congress ‘[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation,’ the language of the 
Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity.” (citation omitted)); Palmore v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397–98 (1973) (“[T]he power of Congress under Clause 
17 permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that 
would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national 
legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art[icle] I, § 8.”). 
 57. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 73–74 & n.27 (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id. at 76; see also Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397 (“Congress may . . . exercise all the 
police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government 
would have in legislating for state or local purposes.”); Kendall v. United States ex rel. 
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838) (“There is in this district, no division of 
powers between the general and state governments.  Congress has the entire control 
over the district for every purpose of government . . . .”). 
 59. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 408. 
 60. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 75–76 (plurality opinion) (labeling D.C. as a “unique 
federal enclave”). 
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“laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern” that 
Congress attempted to authorize the bankruptcy courts to entertain, 
further solidified the distinction.61  This plenary power allows 
Congress to legislate over D.C. completely independent of Article III. 
C. Standing Requirements in Federal Court 
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to hearing cases 
and controversies.62  This doctrine, known as standing, circumscribes 
the ability of federal courts to entertain suits.63  Standing is largely a 
question of whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to have a court 
decide the merits of a particular dispute or issue.64  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted standing to encompass both constitutional and 
prudential limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts.65 
The constitutional aspects of standing mandated by Article III 
involve examining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated the 
existence of a case or controversy between himself and the 
defendant.66  There are three constitutional requirements for 
standing in Article III courts.67  First, the plaintiff must personally 
suffer an injury-in-fact, which is the invasion of a recognized interest 
that is both “concrete and particularized” and also actual or 
imminent.68  Second, there must be a causal connection between the 
injury and the defendant, such that the plaintiff’s injury is “fairly 
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.69  Third, it must be likely that 
a favorable judgment will redress the injury.70 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 76. 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 63. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 
(3d ed. 2012) (stating that standing functions to prevent courts from ruling on certain 
claims). 
 64. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 65. See id. (stating that the “inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on 
federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise”). 
 66. See id. (labeling this “the threshold question in every federal case” (emphasis 
added)). 
 67. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742–43 (1995). 
 68. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  Compare Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184–85 (2000) (holding 
that plaintiffs in an environmental organization did have standing because they 
alleged direct injury to their personal interests), with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727, 739–41 (1972) (denying standing to an environmental organization seeking to 
prevent the construction of a ski resort because the pleading did not allege that the 
construction would personally injure the organization’s members). 
 69. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 757–58 (1984) (holding that the plaintiffs’ 
injury was not fairly traceable to the defendant because the injury was “highly 
indirect and result[ed] from the independent action of some third party” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 
(2007) (concluding that a plaintiff had standing when it alleged that its property 
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Additionally, there are “judicially self-imposed limits” on federal 
court jurisdiction, known as prudential standing requirements.71  The 
prudential aspects include a prohibition on asserting the rights of 
others,72 the requirement of individualized harm rather than a 
“generalized grievance,”73 and the requirement that the plaintiff is 
within the zone of interests to be protected.74  Prudential standing 
requirements can be overridden by Congress and can be granted to 
the full extent of Article III,75 while the Article III elements cannot be 
abrogated by an act of Congress.76 
The paramount policy rationale underlying the Court’s standing 
jurisprudence is the separation of powers.77  This necessitates 
granting federal courts limited jurisdiction to ensure that the courts 
do not intrude on matters best decided by the political branches as a 
democratic principle78 and as a matter of competency.79  The 
                                                          
interests were harmed by the EPA’s refusal to enforce greenhouse gas emission laws 
because the injury could be traced to the EPA). 
 70. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 505–06 (denying standing because economic 
realities made it unlikely that plaintiffs would benefit from a judgment invalidating 
the challenged exclusionary zoning provision). 
 71. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
 72. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004) (requiring that the 
plaintiff assert a claim on his own behalf). 
 73. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20, 23 (1998) (determining that a suit 
brought pursuant to a statute that authorized suit by “any party aggrieved” by an 
agency order did not present a generalized grievance because Congress created a 
statutory right and its violation by the defendant was sufficient to present a 
personalized injury). 
 74. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 
(1970) (establishing that the plaintiff must fall within the group of people the law 
was intended to protect in order to establish standing). 
 75. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) 
(explaining that Congress can expand standing beyond that ordinarily barred by 
prudential standing rules); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“Congress may grant an express 
right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing 
rules.”). 
 76. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (“It is settled that Congress 
cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to 
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”). 
 77. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Article III 
standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”). 
 78. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (reflecting on the “proper—and properly 
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
95 (1968) (explaining that the case-or-controversy requirement helps to “define 
the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power”). 
 79. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (emphasizing that the political branches are better 
suited to decide matters of general significance that are not presented in the context 
of injured individuals); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 63, § 3531.3 (discussing proper 
limitations on the courts as a function of courts’ unrepresentative identity and 
inadequacy in addressing certain issues as compared to the political branches). 
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doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress from using the 
courts as a vehicle to indirectly trample on the executive branch.80 
Article III standing requirements do not apply in state and local 
territorial courts.81  Separation of powers concerns are absent when 
the claim is brought in state court because of the separate protections 
provided by federalism.82  All states have a court of general 
jurisdiction to entertain claims beyond that which a federal court can 
hear.83  This allows state courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, to 
hear a wider range of claims as an original matter.84 
D. D.C. Court Discussions of the Case-or-Controversy Requirement 
The D.C. Court of Appeals has provided widely inconsistent 
jurisprudence regarding the applicability of Article III standing 
requirements in D.C. courts.  Supreme Court precedent indicates 
that Article III does not apply of its own force in D.C. courts, so the 
requirement would have to come from another source.85  Therefore, 
                                                          
 80. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890–97 (1983) (decrying Congress’s 
increased use of the relaxed definition of standing to indirectly circumvent 
separation of powers by empowering a greater range of individuals to challenge 
executive actions in the courts).  Additional policy reasons for standing include the 
preservation of scarce judicial resources and the related concept that injured parties 
have sufficient motivation to present the court with the necessary advocacy.  See 
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (opining that plaintiffs who assert their 
own rights will come to court with “the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation” 
that might otherwise be lacking); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1 
(6th ed. 2012) (discussing the desire to expend judicial resources only to address an 
aggrieved party). 
 81. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983) (“[S]tate courts need 
not impose the same standing or remedial requirements that govern federal-court 
proceedings.”); see, e.g., ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1225–
26 (N.M. 2008) (“Under the New Mexico Constitution, state courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction, and our constitution contains no analogue to the federal ‘cases 
and controversies’ language.”); Benavente v. Taitano, 2006 Guam 15 ¶ 17 (“[T]he 
Organic Act of Guam provides no express case or controversy requirement similar to 
the standing requirements found in Article III.”). 
 82. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (observing that “the 
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts 
are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy” because the “allocation of 
authority in the federal system” provides a comparable check to separation of 
powers). 
 83. See Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State 
Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1163 & n.76 (1984) (describing how almost all 
states have a court with original jurisdiction over all matters at law and equity). 
 84. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(describing federal courts as “courts of limited jurisdiction”); Heather Elliott, 
Congress’s Inability To Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 209 n.300 (2011) 
(“Article III courts are not courts of general jurisdiction the way state courts 
are . . . .”). 
 85. See French, supra note 7, at 267 (emphasizing that the case-or-controversy 
requirement is not constitutionally mandated and so must be statutorily imposed). 
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the uncertainty largely revolves around whether section 11-705(b) of 
the D.C. Code statutorily incorporated the case-or-controversy 
requirement.86 
The first D.C. court to cite section 11-705(b) was United States v. 
Cummings,87 which stated that D.C. courts were limited to hearing 
cases and controversies.88  The following year, after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Palmore, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that 
D.C. courts “are not bound by the requirements of Article III,” but 
the court implied that its jurisdiction “extends as far as Congress has 
granted it.”89  The court, however, refused to answer the question of 
the extent of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction.90  The language of the 
court that it was following the principles of standing, justiciability, 
and mootness “to promote sound judicial economy” reflects the view 
that standing requirements were adopted wholly as a prudential 
matter rather than statutorily mandated.91 
Later courts began to cite section 11-705(b) as indicating that 
Congress statutorily incorporated Article III standing requirements in 
D.C. courts.92  In Lee v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review,93 
the court took it as a natural progression that because D.C. courts 
were constrained by a case-or-controversy requirement, it was wise to 
                                                          
 86. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of 
section 11-705(b)). 
 87. 301 A.2d 229 (D.C. 1973) (per curiam). 
 88. Id. at 231. 
 89. District of Columbia v. Walters, 319 A.2d 332, 338 n.13 (D.C. 1974). 
 90. See id. (citing prior cases that did not “examin[e] the limits of this grant” and 
not doing so itself). 
 91. See id. (differentiating the two requirements).  The Walters court did not cite 
to section 11-705(b) in support of the statement that Congress granted limited 
jurisdiction to D.C. courts.  See Lee v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210, 
216 n.13 (D.C. 1980) (observing in a parenthetical citation to Walters that the Walters 
court did not cite to section 11-705(b) in support of the statement that Congress 
granted limited jurisdiction to D.C. courts). 
 92. See, e.g., Friends of Tilden Park, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201, 
1206 (D.C. 2002) (applying the case-or-controversy requirement despite 
acknowledging that the court was not established under Article III (citing D.C. CODE 
§ 11-705(b)); Fisher v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 762 A.2d 35, 38 n.7 (D.C. 2000) (stating 
that the court is bound to hear only cases and controversies by “our own governing 
statute”); Cmty. Credit Union Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Express Servs. Corp., 534 A.2d 331, 
333 (D.C. 1987) (“Although this court is not governed by standing requirements 
under [A]rticle III of the Constitution, we look to federal jurisprudence to define the 
limits of ‘[c]ases and controversies’ that our enabling statute empowers us to hear.” 
(second alteration in original)); Lee, 423 A.2d at 216 n.13 (“In creating this court . . . 
Congress provided that we, like the federal courts, should hear only ‘[c]ases and 
controversies.’” (alteration in original) (citing D.C. CODE § 11-705(b))); Kopff v. 
D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 381 A.2d 1372, 1378 n.11 (D.C. 1977) 
(“[O]ur jurisdiction is limited by the same ‘case or controversy’ requirement, see 
D.C. CODE § 11-705(b), as that imposed on the Article III courts . . . .”). 
 93. 423 A.2d 210 (D.C. 1980). 
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also adopt the Supreme Court’s standing tests.94  Courts subsequently 
expounded upon this view and paralleled the case-or-controversy 
requirement in section 11-705(b) that allegedly binds D.C. courts to 
the Article III provision that binds federal courts.95  These courts 
established that D.C. standing principles encompass two aspects:  
Article III requirements incorporated via section 11-705(b) and 
prudential principles that the D.C. courts adopted.96 
Other courts have expressly contradicted these statements, 
declaring that standing in D.C. is purely a prudential matter.  In 
Banks v. Ferrell97 the court noted that it is “true that the judicial power 
of the local D.C. courts may extend beyond the case or controversy 
requirement.”98  Elsewhere, the court has stated that it “generally 
adhere[s] to the case and controversy requirement,”99 but that it is 
not bound by either the Article III standing requirements in 
general100 or the case-or-controversy requirement in particular.101  
This confusion regarding which⎯if any⎯aspects of Article III 
                                                          
 94. See id. at 216 n.13 (labeling the adoption of the injury-in-fact requirement as 
a “logical and appropriate component in the test for standing before this court”). 
 95. Cmty. Credit Union, 534 A.2d at 333 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. 
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)); see also 
Friends of Tilden Park, 806 A.2d at 1206–07 & n.5 (distinguishing between 
constitutional standing and prudential principles). 
 96. See Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1160 (D.C. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs 
must meet “both the ‘constitutional’ requirement of a ‘case or controversy’ and the 
‘prudential’ prerequisites of standing”). 
 97. 411 A.2d 54 (D.C. 1979). 
 98. Id. at 56 n.7; see also S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969) (“By creating the local 
courts under authority granted by [A]rticle I of the Constitution, the local District of 
Columbia court structure is not bound by the provisions found in [A]rticle III of the 
Constitution.”). 
 99. Riverside Hosp. v. D.C. Dep’t of Health, 944 A.2d 1098, 1103–04 (D.C. 2008); 
see also Cropp v. Williams, 841 A.2d 328, 330 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam) (stating that 
the court is “not bound strictly by the ‘case or controversy’ requirements of Article 
III”); District of Columbia v. Grp. Ins. Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 12 (D.C. 1993) 
(“Although we, unlike the federal courts, are not bound by the ‘case or controversy’ 
requirement of Article III of the Constitution, we have adopted this requirement for 
prudential reasons . . . .”). 
 100. Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 706 n.4 (D.C. 2009) 
(“[T]he standing requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution do not govern 
the jurisdiction of our courts.”). 
 101. Bd. of Dirs. of the Wash. City Orphan Asylum v. Bd. of Trs. of the Wash. City 
Orphan Asylum, 798 A.2d 1068, 1074 (D.C. 2002) (“[T]his court is not bound by 
‘case or controversy’ requirements set forth in Article III.”); see also Consumer Fed’n 
of Am. v. Upjohn Co., 346 A.2d 725, 727 n.6 (D.C. 1975) (“[T]he rules of standing as 
applied in the federal courts are substantially the same as those which govern the 
instant case in Superior Court.” (emphasis added)).  While it is possible that these 
courts were referring to the absence of a constitutional requirement rather a 
statutory mandate, the lack of consistency and clarity nonetheless clouds the issue. 
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standing are mandated by statute and which have been prudentially 
adopted by the court has left the area greatly unsettled.102 
The D.C. Court of Appeals has made it clear that it is not bound by 
Supreme Court precedent regarding justiciability and can hear cases 
that would be barred from adjudication in Article III courts.  For 
example, courts have admitted that they have the power to issue 
advisory opinions,103 rule on moot cases,104 and decide cases not yet 
ripe.105  Additionally, the D.C. Council may provide a right of action 
that would otherwise be barred by the courts’ prudential standing 
rules.106 
Descriptions of the Superior Court as a court of general 
jurisdiction further muddle the matter.  The D.C. Code provides that 
the Superior Court has jurisdiction over “any civil action or other 
matter,”107 leading to the label of the Superior Court as a “court of 
general jurisdiction.”108  Legislative history of the D.C. Courts Act also 
includes a reference to the Superior Court as a court of general 
jurisdiction.109  When coupled with Congress’s intent to create the 
D.C. courts in the image of state courts, the purported case-or-
controversy limitation to the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction raises 
major questions about the true extent of the D.C. courts’ jurisdiction. 
                                                          
 102. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 260 n.9 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our opinions have not all adhered to 
the distinction between what is mandated and what we, by choice, require.”); Grayson 
I, 980 A.2d 1137, 1155 n.78 (D.C. 2009) (“[T]his court is not bound by the case or 
controversy requirement of Article III.”), rev’d en banc, 15 A.3d 219; see also Andrew 
Kim, Note, “Standing” in the Way of Equality?  The Myth of Proponent Standing and the 
Jurisdictional Error in Perry v. Brown, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1867, 1885 n.134 (2012) 
(stating that D.C. “subscribes to Article III principles of justiciability”). 
 103. See Clayton v. United States, 429 A.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. 1981) (expressing 
“reluctance to render an advisory opinion” on prudential grounds but implying that 
the court nonetheless retained the power to hear them). 
 104. See Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (“[T]he 
decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness are not binding on this 
court.”). 
 105. See Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 572 n.17 (D.C. 1992) (exercising the 
court’s “flexibility” and “discretion” to decide a ripeness issue). 
 106. See Exec. Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 732–33 
(D.C. 2000) (holding that the D.C. Council had the power to enact a statute that 
overrides the prudential standing limits imposed by D.C. courts); cf. supra note 75 
and accompanying text (recognizing Congress’s power to override the Supreme 
Court’s prudential standing requirements). 
 107. D.C. CODE § 11-921(a)(6) (2001). 
 108. E.g., Cormier v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 959 A.2d 658, 664 n.3 (D.C. 
2008); Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979); see Williams, supra note 27, 
at 484 (describing the D.C. court system as one of “general jurisdiction”). 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 33 (1970). 
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II. D.C. COURTS EXIST UNENCUMBERED BY THE CASE-OR-
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT 
A. CPPA and Grayson History 
The D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act110 (CPPA) is a 
consumer protection statute designed to protect against unfair trade 
practices.111  Prior to 2000, the CPPA permitted suit by “[a]ny 
consumer who suffers any damage” from an illegal trade practice.112  
Under this version, the complainant must be a consumer who 
personally suffered some damage.113  In 2000, the CPPA was amended 
to provide that “[a] person, whether acting for the interests of itself, 
its members, or the general public, may bring an action under this 
chapter.”114  On its face, this amendment could be interpreted as 
removing the injury-in-fact requirement from CPPA suits by 
permitting suit by any person whenever an unfair trade practice 
injures D.C. consumers, regardless of whether the complainant was 
personally injured.115  This amendment raised two separate 
questions previously left unanswered by the D.C. Court of Appeals:  
Does the case-or-controversy requirement apply in D.C. courts and, 
if so, what is its source?  If statutorily incorporated by Congress in 
section 11-705(b), a separate question arises as to whether the D.C. 
Council passed a law affecting the jurisdiction of the courts, which 
Congress prohibited.116  If adopted by the D.C. Court of Appeals as a 
prudential measure, can the D.C. Council overcome it just as 
Congress can overcome the prudential standing requirements in 
Article III courts?117 
                                                          
 110. D.C. CODE § 28-3901 to -3913. 
 111. See Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 717 (D.C. 2003) 
(detailing the purposes of the CPPA). 
 112. D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1). 
 113. Grayson I, 980 A.2d 1137, 1154 (D.C. 2009), rev’d en banc, 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011). 
 114. D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1) (emphasis added). 
 115. See Corrected Joint Brief of Appellants Alan Grayson and Paul M. Breakman, 
Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219 (Nos. 07-CV-1264, 08-CV-1089), 2010 WL 7163426, at *11–12 
(arguing that it was “crystal clear” that the D.C. Council intended to remove the 
injury-in-fact requirement).  Such statutes are known colloquially as private attorney 
general statutes because they permit individuals to bring suits typically enforced only 
by the government.  See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First 
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 622–30 (2005) (describing the standing 
impediments presented by private attorney general statutes in federal court). 
 116. D.C. CODE § 1-206.02(a)(4); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 117. Stated another way, is the distinction between constitutional and prudential 
standing requirements in Article III courts of any consequence if D.C. courts 
prudentially adopted them?  See supra note 106 and accompanying text (identifying 
the Council’s power to enact statutes overcoming prudential limitations). 
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Complainants Grayson and Breakman brought separate CPPA 
claims, but both alleged to bring their claims on behalf of the 
“general public.”118  Grayson alleged that telephone companies that 
had issued prepaid calling cards did not turn over the unused 
amounts—purportedly amounting to millions of dollars—to the 
D.C. Mayor as required by law.119  Breakman alleged that AOL 
charged current and past members double the price for Internet 
service that it offered to new members.120  Notably, Breakman did 
not allege that he ever subscribed to AOL; rather, he brought the 
suit “in a representative capacity on behalf of the interests of the 
general public.”121 
The trial court dismissed Grayson’s complaint for lack of standing 
and failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.122  The 
D.C. Court of Appeals in Grayson v. AT&T Corp. (Grayson I)123 
performed a short analysis of the standing issue and determined that 
the 2000 amendment demonstrated the D.C. Council’s intent to 
eliminate the injury-in-fact requirement, meaning that a complainant 
need not have personally suffered injury to maintain a suit.124  The 
court focused on the fact that the amended section eliminated the 
“suffer any damages” language to conclude that a complainant could 
bring suit without any injury to himself.125  Additionally, the court 
examined subsection 28-3905(k)(2), which states that nothing in the 
CPPA prevents a person “who is injured” from exercising other rights 
or remedies.126  The court was able to infer a distinction between 
subsection (k)(1), which applied to all persons, and subsection 
(k)(2), which applied to only those who were injured.127  Asserting 
that “this court is not bound by the case or controversy requirement 
of Article III,” the court reversed and remanded, holding that injury-
in-fact was not required to maintain a claim under the CPPA.128 
Breakman’s complaint was also dismissed for lack of standing by 
the trial court.129  Described as someone who “has never had a 
contractual relationship with defendant” and was not injured 
                                                          
 118. Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 227. 
 119. Id. at 225. 
 120. Id. at 227. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 227–28. 
 123. 980 A.2d 1137 (D.C. 2009), rev’d en banc, 15 A.3d 219. 
 124. Id. at 1154–55. 
 125. Id. at 1154. 
 126. Id. at 1154–55. 
 127. Id. at 1155. 
 128. Id. at 1155 n.78, 1157–58. 
 129. Breakman v. AOL LLC, No. 2008 CA 532, 2008 WL 8083443, at *1 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. July 28, 2008). 
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personally by AOL’s actions, the court easily found that he lacked 
standing because he suffered no personal injury.130  The Court of 
Appeals in an unpublished memorandum opinion reversed and 
remanded, deeming itself bound by the panel’s decision in Grayson I 
that injury-in-fact was not necessary for a CPPA claim.131  The Court of 
Appeals then vacated both opinions and granted a consolidated 
rehearing en banc.132 
B. Grayson II Ducks the Question, Throwing Precedent Into Doubt 
The D.C. Court of Appeals sitting en banc in Grayson II was 
presented with a clear opportunity to settle prior inconsistent 
jurisprudence regarding the applicability of standing requirements in 
D.C. courts.133  The court recognized the appellee’s argument that 
the opinion in Grayson I effectively “rewr[ote] this Court’s standing 
jurisprudence” and thus presented “a question of exceptional 
importance” worthy of an en banc sitting.134  Nonetheless, the court 
completely avoided the standing question and reversed Grayson I.  It 
did so by resting on shaky statutory interpretation and legislative 
history grounds when it held that the 2000 CPPA amendments “do 
not reveal an explicit intent of the Council to erase the constitutional 
standing requirement to which this court has adhered during the 
past several decades.”135 
In a footnote, the court’s true motivations for its holding were 
made apparent:  “Since we conclude that the CPPA retains our injury-
in-fact standing requirement, we do not need to address and we take 
no position on whether Congress by statute has imposed Article III’s 
standing requirement on the local courts of the District of Columbia 
through D.C. Code § 11-705(b).”136  By deciding on these grounds, 
                                                          
 130. Id. at *5. 
 131. Breakman v. AOL, No. 08-CV-1089, 2009 WL 4808796 (D.C. Nov. 10, 2009). 
 132. Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 989 A.2d 709, 709 (D.C. 2010) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (consolidating the cases and ordering rehearing en banc).  Grayson also 
brought a qui tam action under the D.C. False Claims Act.  The court in Grayson I 
held that the public disclosure bar in the FCA prohibited Grayson’s suit.  Grayson I, 
908 A.2d at 1153.  That portion of the Grayson I opinion was not vacated by the 
court’s grant of en banc.  Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 223 n.1 (D.C. 2011) (en banc). 
 133. Brief for the Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 9, Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219 (Nos. 07-CV-1264, 08-CV-
1089), 2010 WL 7163424, at *9. 
 134. Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 223 n.1. 
 135. Id. at 224.  Interestingly, Judge Inez Smith Reid authored both Grayson 
opinions. 
 136. Id. at 232 n.29.  Grayson II also avoided the question of “whether it will follow 
the facial plausibility standard enunciated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,” id. at 229 n.16, but 
subsequently answered in the affirmative in a panel decision released nine months 
later, Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C. 2011). 
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the court was able to avoid answering the difficult question that has 
troubled D.C. courts for years.137 
C. Section 11-705(b) Does Not Incorporate Article III’s Case-or-Controversy 
Requirement 
Grayson II left a critical and fundamental question unanswered:  
Can the D.C. Council pass a statute that does not require injury-in-
fact?138  To answer this question, one must determine first whether 
Article III’s standing requirement was statutorily incorporated via 
section 11-705(b).  If it was, the next question is whether such an 
amendment would impact the organization or jurisdiction of the 
courts.  If not, then the Council does not appear to have any 
impediments to enacting the law.139 
In full, section 11-705(b) states:  “Cases and controversies shall be 
heard and determined by divisions of the court unless a hearing or a 
rehearing before the court in banc is ordered.  Each division of the 
court shall consist of three judges.”140  One early commentator 
hypothesized that Congress may have created the D.C. courts 
pursuant to Article I in order to circumvent Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement.141  The same commentator implored that 
the use of the words “cases and controversies” in section 11-705(b) 
“should not be construed to denote the limited category of legal 
                                                          
 137. See supra notes 85–102 (presenting the various viewpoints regarding the 
application of the case-or-controversy requirement).  The D.C. Council introduced an 
amendment to the CPPA that would have legislatively overruled Grayson II by permitting a 
non-profit organization to bring suit “regardless of whether or not the organization itself 
has suffered or would suffer an injury in fact.”  Consumer Protection Amendment Act of 
2011, B19-0581 § 102(c) (as introduced to the D.C. Council Comm. of the Whole, Nov. 
16, 2011), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20111116102513.pdf.  
The D.C. Council ultimately passed the amendment but significantly altered the language 
to require that the court dismiss any suit brought by a non-profit that “does not have 
sufficient nexus to the interests involved.”  Consumer Protection Act of 2012, A19-0647 § 
2(b)(3) (enacted Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at D.C. CODE § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(ii)), 
available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20130118162155.pdf. 
 138. See Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 11 (stating that the 
question of whether D.C. courts are limited to hearing cases and controversies is a 
matter of statutory interpretation, not constitutionality); French, supra note 7, at 273 
(“[T]he broad grant of plenary authority over the District of Columbia courts would 
allow the Congress to eliminate the requirement of a case or controversy 
entirely . . . .”). 
 139. See French, supra note 7, at 267 (“Only if some specific prohibition is found 
upon the exercise of the Council’s power may it fairly be concluded that the Council 
is without such legislative authority [to expand jurisdiction beyond cases or 
controversies].”). 
 140. D.C. CODE § 11-705(b) (2001). 
 141. Williams, supra note 27, at 490 (“The explicit reliance on [A]rticle I in the 
designation of ‘District of Columbia Courts’ also may be intended to avoid the case 
or controversy constraint placed upon federal court jurisdiction by [A]rticle 
III . . . .”). 
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business which [A]rticle III of the Constitution describes as being 
appropriate for cognizance by federal, constitutional courts.”142  The 
argument that the phrase “cases and controversies” does not entail its 
Article III meaning and could be substituted with synonyms such as 
claims, matters, or disputes without creating any substantive changes 
is supported by the legislative history and title of the section.143  In 
her separate opinion in Grayson II, Judge Ruiz argued that 
subscribing to the case-or-controversy requirement “has been a choice 
that the court has made—not a mandate we must follow.”144  This is 
supported by the legislative history, which states that “the local 
District of Columbia court structure is not bound by the provisions 
found in Article III of the Constitution.”145 
The legislative history of the Court Reform Act indicates that 
Congress intended the local D.C. courts to function analogously to 
state courts.146  A near-necessary component of a state court system is 
a court of general jurisdiction.147  Although some states do not place 
general jurisdiction in one particular court, there is at least one court 
available in the state that does have jurisdiction to hear the claim.148  
Because all original jurisdiction over local matters is vested in D.C. 
Superior Court, it must be a court of general jurisdiction. 
The statutory grant of jurisdiction of the D.C. Superior Court 
extends to “any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity),”149 
while the D.C. Court of Appeals is empowered to hear “all final 
orders and judgments of the Superior Court.”150  It stretches 
credibility to interpret the Superior Court to hear matters that the 
Court of Appeals cannot hear on appeal.151  Likewise, section 11-
                                                          
 142. Id. at 501. 
 143. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 262–63 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “[t]he likely explanation is 
that Congressional drafters . . . used the term [cases or controversies] as ‘shorthand’ 
for ‘appeal’ without realizing its implications as a constitutional term of art”). 
 144. Id. at 259. 
 145. S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969). 
 146. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 147. See Gordon & Gross, supra note 83, at 1163 & n.76 (reporting that almost all 
states have a court of general jurisdiction, and those that do not have at least one 
court with jurisdiction). 
 148. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 149. D.C. CODE § 11-921(a) (2001). 
 150. Id. § 11-721(a)(1); see also id. § 11-721(b) (providing that a party may appeal 
any order or judgment of the Superior Court to the Court of Appeals “as of right”). 
 151. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 262 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (identifying the “truly anomalous and indeed absurd” 
interpretation that gives the Superior Court far greater jurisdiction than the Court of 
Appeals); Brief for the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees and Supporting Affirmance, Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219 (Nos. 07-CV-001264, 
08-CV-001089), 2010 WL 7163423, at *5. 
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705(b), which refers only to the Court of Appeals, should not serve as 
a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.152  The case-or-
controversy requirement was designed to apply in federal courts, 
which are courts of limited jurisdiction.153  Applying these same 
standards in courts of purported general jurisdiction is inconsistent 
with Congress’s intent to create a D.C. court system analogous to 
those in the states.154  A literal reading of section 11-705(b) could 
produce the result that the Court of Appeals is limited to hearing 
cases and controversies only when it sits with three judges, but when 
the court sits en banc this limitation does not apply.155  If the word 
“unless” in the first sentence is read to negate the “cases and 
controversies” language in addition to the “divisions of the court” 
language, then this results.156  Nothing explicit or implicit indicates 
such a result.157 
Additionally, Congress’s treatment of the D.C. Court of Appeals as 
a state supreme court for purposes of Supreme Court certiorari158 
underscores its intent to create a court system without the constraints 
of Article III, including the case-or-controversy requirement.159  
Section 11-705(b) covers the organization of the court when it is in 
session, the inclusion of the phrase “[c]ases and controversies” does 
not provide a substantive limitation on the court’s jurisdiction.160  
                                                          
 152. Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 15 (arguing that allowing 
the Superior Court to have greater jurisdiction than the Court of Appeals is not 
“sensible”); Response in Opposition to Burger King Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss at 9 
n.27, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. Burger King Corp., No. 07-CA-003363 B, 
2008 WL 6631845 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2008) (contending that a literal reading 
of section 11-705(b) would have it apply neither to the Court of Appeals sitting en 
banc nor the Superior Court, and therefore implying an intent for all D.C. courts to 
be limited to hearing cases or controversies is inconsistent with Congress’s intent for 
D.C. court to be analogous to state courts). 
 153. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 
(noting that federal courts have limited jurisdiction in that they “possess only that 
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by 
judicial decree” (citations omitted)). 
 154. See Williams, supra note 27, at 484 (“The principal achievement . . . after all, is 
to create an entirely new local court system of general jurisdiction, independent of 
the federal judiciary.”). 
 155. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 262 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (highlighting the incongruous result that panels of three judges would be 
under jurisdictional constraints while the en banc court would not); Williams, supra 
note 27, at 501. 
 156. See Response in Opposition, supra note 152, at 9 n.27 (arguing that Congress 
should not be presumed to have intended such a result). 
 157. See Williams, supra note 27, at 501 (“[T]here is no indication, in general 
policy or express purpose, of a congressional intent to have ‘cases and controversies’ 
heard by three-judge divisions, with other court business to be heard otherwise.”). 
 158. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
 159. Williams, supra note 27, at 492. 
 160. Brief for the District of Columbia, supra note 151, at 4. 
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The use of the phrase “cases and controversies” is meant merely as a 
way to describe when the court is acting in its judicial function.161 
The title headings further indicate that Congress did intend 
section 11-705(b) to serve as a jurisdictional statute. Title headings 
can be used as an interpretive tool to shed light on the meaning of a 
section when there is ambiguity or confusion.162  Reference should be 
made to titles when the statute lends itself to multiple 
interpretations.163  It is clear from four decades of precedent that 
section 11-705(b) is far from clear.164  Reference to titles is 
appropriate because of the ambiguity surrounding section 11-
705(b).165  Title 11 is entitled “Organization and Jurisdiction of the 
Courts,” section 7 is titled “District of Columbia Court of Appeals,” 
and subchapter I is titled “Continuation and Organization.”  Section 
11-705 is titled “Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings.”166  
Subchapter II is titled “Jurisdiction” and contains the jurisdictional 
provisions relating to the Court of Appeals.  Far from indicating that 
Congress intended to incorporate Article III standing requirements 
via a nondescript subsection, the titles indicate that section 11-705(b) 
was intended to merely govern matters incidental to deciding cases.167  
The true intent of section 11-705(b) was to permit the court to sit in 
                                                          
 161. See Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 16 (claiming that the 
reference is “purely descriptive”). 
 162. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 
(1947) (“[The] heading is but a short-hand reference to the general subject matter 
involved. . . .  For interpretative purposes, they are of use only when they shed light 
on some ambiguous word or phrase.  They are but tools available for the resolution 
of a doubt.  But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.”); United 
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (“Where the mind labours to 
discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be 
derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due 
share of consideration.”). 
 163. Bellew v. Dedeaux, 126 So. 2d 249, 251 (Miss. 1961) (“If there is any 
uncertainty in the body of an act, the title may be resorted to for the purpose of 
ascertaining legislative intent and of relieving the ambiguity.”). 
 164. See supra Part I.D (chronicling the confusion regarding the meaning of the 
section); see also Grayson II, 15 A.3d 219, 262 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (Ruiz, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to title headings of the D.C. 
Code to divine the intent behind section 11-705(b)). 
 165. Cf. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 18:7, at 76–77 (7th ed. 2009) (“A statute’s title may not be 
considered to determine whether a statute is ambiguous and thus whether courts 
may look beyond the language of the statute.”). 
 166. Brief for the Legal Aid Society, supra note 133, at 16 (arguing that the titles 
undermine any argument that the section is meant to constrain jurisdiction). 
 167. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 262 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (imploring that section 11-705(b) is “properly read as an administrative 
provision directing the composition of divisions of the Court of Appeals in all cases 
other than those that are heard by an en banc court”). 
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panels of three judges, not to limit its jurisdiction.168  While the 
legislative history is far from dispositive, the titles coupled with an 
absence of any reference to Article III standing requirements 
necessitates the interpretation that section 11-705(b) did not 
statutorily incorporate the case-or-controversy requirement.169 
In fact, Congress took pains to note that it was creating the courts 
pursuant to its Article I powers in order to free the courts from 
Article III’s constraints.170  Although the holding in Palmore only 
covered Article III, section 1, there is no reason it should not also 
encompass Article III, section 2.171  Additionally, even if Congress 
originally intended to incorporate the case-or-controversy 
requirement, its continued applicability is not clear.  Section 11-
705(b) was enacted while the D.C. courts were still Article III 
courts,172 to which the case-or-controversy requirement does apply.  
The courts were later reestablished pursuant to Article I. 
Policy rationales that underpin the Article III case-or-controversy 
requirement are not present in D.C. courts.  The Court has 
repeatedly stated that one of the main purposes of the case-or-
controversy requirement is to protect the separation of powers 
between coequal branches of government.173  The local D.C. courts 
simply are not in the same position to exert influence equal to that 
which can be exerted by Article III courts.174  D.C. courts are not 
permitted to hear cases that involve many federal issues, as 
jurisdiction is granted exclusively to the Article III courts.175  As the 
Supreme Court has stated, “the law of Art[icle]  III standing is built 
                                                          
 168. See id. (referring to these as “procedural provisions”); supra notes 35–40 
(discussing the legislative history of the section). 
 169. See Grayson II, 15 A.3d at 262–63 (Ruiz, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (explaining that “[t]he likely explanation is that Congressional drafters 
inadvertently copied the term [cases or controversies] term from an analogous 
provision that applies to the federal appellate courts . . . without realizing its 
implications as a constitutional term of art”). 
 170. H.R. REP. NO. 91-907, at 44 (1969); S. REP. NO. 91-405, at 18 (1969). 
 171. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing how Congress can legislate over D.C. entirely 
free from Article III). 
 172. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933) (holding that the 
prior D.C. court system consisted of Article III courts). 
 173. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (discussing the proper, limited role of federal 
courts in reviewing acts of the executive and legislative branches). 
 174. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 581 (1962) (plurality opinion) 
(“The restraints of federalism are, of course, removed from the powers exercisable by 
Congress within the District. . . .  Thus those limitations implicit in the rubric ‘case or 
controversy’ that spring from the Framers’ anxiety not to intrude unduly upon the 
general jurisdiction of state courts need have no application in the District.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 175. See D.C. CODE § 11-921(b) (2001). 
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on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”176  Just as 
expanded standing in state courts does not threaten the separation of 
powers and the role of the federal executive and legislative branches, 
expanded standing in D.C. courts also does not threaten the 
constitutional structure of separation of powers.177  D.C. courts do not 
stand on equal footing with the federal legislative and executive 
branches, therefore they cannot impinge on those branches’ proper 
roles.178  The limited geographic reach of the D.C. courts that Justice 
Brennan described in Northern Pipeline also means that any abuses of 
the restraint function played by Article III will have a limited 
impact.179  The legislative history, titles, and policy principles all 
indicate that section 11-705(b) does not statutorily incorporate the 
Article III case-or-controversy requirement.  Therefore, the D.C. 
Council can grant standing absent injury-in-fact. 
CONCLUSION 
The court in Grayson II avoided a question with a potentially wide-
ranging impact.  D.C. courts are not the only non-Article III courts of 
general jurisdiction.  The reach of section 11-705(b) presents deeper 
constitutional law issues regarding the extent of Congress’s ability to 
confer jurisdiction on non-Article III courts beyond the limits of 
Article III.  While Congress is the exclusive sovereign in D.C., the 
territories exercise inherent sovereignty that was only partially ceded 
to Congress.  If Congress can create the D.C. courts unencumbered 
by Article III requirements, then there is no obvious prohibition on 
lowering the jurisdictional bar in these federal non-Article III 
territorial courts to usurp the jurisdiction of the local territorial 
courts.  The territories are not constitutionally differentiated from 
D.C., only in the level of sovereignty delegated by Congress. 
 
                                                          
 176. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
 177. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 581–82 (plurality opinion) (stating that the case-or-
controversy requirement was intended to maintain separation of powers only in 
relation to federal courts that deal with matters of national concern). 
 178. While it is true that the D.C. courts’ lack of jurisdiction over federal matters 
comes from a statute that Congress could potentially amend and provide another 
avenue for Justice Scalia’s alleged improper interference with the executive branch 
via the judiciary, this theoretical possibility does not justify the undue limitations it 
would place on the courts. 
 179. See Arthur N. Chagris, Palmore v. United States:  The Interrelationship of Article I 
and Article III of the Constitution, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 119, 127 (1973) (contending that 
the “particularized need” for D.C. courts exceeds the benefits imposed by Article III’s 
protections). 
